From this 2*2, think whether an interest group will act or not. If benefits are aggregated, then activity is likely. Or if costs are concentrated, then the group acts.
Legislative
strategy: Healthcare Act
Used to determine what policy change is feasible, and
identify proposers, agenda setters and pivotal politicians
·
Median
Voter Theorem: Median voter’s ideal point is preferred to all other points
by at least a majority and thus is the predicted outcome.
·
Application:
Place Senators on a line from 1 (liberal) to 100 (conservative) for a
particular issue and determine the median voters. Order based on voting
history.
·
Points to
consider:
o
Rankings need to be issue specific, not just
overall liberalism vs conservatism
o
Target legislators who care little about an
issue (cheaper to “buy”) or horse-trade with
o
Consider who gets the biggest payoff for their
support
o
Synergies between agenda setting and vote buying
o
In vote buying, supporters have a natural
advantage
o
Not every legislator wants to make themselves
appear pivotal because may appear to be flip flopping
·
Implementation
of Vote “Buying”
o
Change elements of the bill that the politician
cares about (i.e. abortion restrictions)
o
Write in policy changes on other issues (i.e.
“pork” in home constituency)
o
Promise campaign contributions from party to
sway election outcome (for firms is primarily to secure future access)
o
Promise electoral support, advertising and
rallies –through rent chain, coalition partners
·
Influence
at the margin: Target resources and persuasion strategies to those
politicians whose votes matter most and who can be swayed
·
Lobbying:
o
Lobby if Pr(Winning | Lobby)*Net Benefit of Win
- Cost of Lobbying > 0
US House Voting Rules
House of
Representatives: Simple majority of the 435 members
Senate: Simple
majority required to pass but due to filibuster, need 60 of the 100 senators to
agree to call for a vote
Overturning
Presidential Veto: this requires a super majority (2/3) in both houses
Final notes
Lobby if Pr(Winning | Lobby)*Net Benefit of Win - Cost of Lobbying > 0
Probability of winning depends on distributive politics (interest groups etc.)
Net benefit of winning is a financial exercise
Cost of lobbying depends on who are the median politicians.
Look at the last slide deck by prof.
Look at the last slide deck by prof.
